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A B S T R A C T
In this article, I examine how nudging powered by Big Data relates to both negative and positive liberty. I focus
in particular on how liberty is affected by appeals to irrational mechanisms. I conclude that it is problematic to
use liberty as an argument for nudging. Such an argument would have to be based on the concept of positive
liberty, empowerment and emancipation from irrationality, but I argue that even stronger arguments against
nudging can be built on the same conception of liberty. I consider Big Data-powered nudging to have the po-
tential to be both manipulative and coercive, and believe that we should be wary of the effects such efforts have
on liberty. As I consider liberty to be part of what makes a good society, this becomes an effort to analyse one
aspect of the effects of technology on society in general. While I do not accept arguments in favour of nudging
based on liberty, it is easier to see that arguments based on utility could support nudging. I do not evaluate what
the proper trade-off is between utility and liberty in this article, and it is obvious that, at times, utility trumps an
absolute demand for liberty. However, I argue in favour of transparent traditional regulation and rational
persuasion instead of nudging, when these approaches can serve the same purposes. Should we choose to nudge,
we should not euphemise our efforts by claiming that we do so on behalf of freedom.
1. Introduction
Imagine that I could make you do what I wanted you to do without
you realising that I was even involved. All I would have to do is to
rearrange the information around you in ways I know would lead you in
the direction I desired. I could change the sequence of the choices you
have to make, and use my knowledge of your susceptibilities and
weaknesses to choose the appropriate time and method of delivering
my nudge.
In this article, I examine how nudging powered by Big Data relates
to both negative and positive liberty. I first examine nudging theory as
expounded in Sunstein & Thaler's [1] classic book Nudge. The techni-
ques of nudging are considered to be universal, as they can be used by
both private and public actors, for any imaginable purpose [2]; p. 12). I
focus in particular on how liberty is affected by appeals to irrational
mechanisms. I contrast nudging with rational persuasion, and, while
some rhetoric and emotion is necessarily a part of rational persuasion, I
consider it superior to methods of influence that appeal to our sub- or
pre-rational faculties.
I then proceed to describe how nudging has changed with the advent
of Big Data. Both the government and private companies gather data,
and they use the data they have gathered to influence us in various
ways. Nudging is based on knowledge of people and their
susceptibilities, and I argue that nudging is becoming increasingly ef-
fective in three ways. Firstly, the fact that we now have more in-
formation about individuals means that we can nudge them more ef-
fectively. Secondly, given the amount of information we have about
how human beings act, we now have increasingly sophisticated theories
about how individuals function. They can be used to target human
vulnerabilities in ever more effective ways. Thirdly, we now have the
means to target people individually, through channels such as social
media, online advertising, targeted location-based information on their
phones etc. Nudging is becoming more like precision bombing than the
carpet-bombing of old, which makes it more effective.
In sum, nudge comes to shove in the era of Big Data, and I argue that
this development is detrimental to both positive and negative liberty
[3]. I will develop a set of propositions that will subsequently be used as
premises for the argument proposed in the conclusion. There, I argue
that nudging may constitute a form of secret coercion that is deeply
troubling, and that we should not use the difficulty of regulating it as an
excuse for not trying to do so. Griffy-Brown, Earp & Rosas [4] note the
need to analyse the effects technology has on what they label the Good
Society, and freedom is put forth as one of the foundational values of
such a society [4]. Coeckelbergh [5] discusses the same issues, and
explicitly calls for the use of more political philosophy in order to un-
derstand how technology affects society. Political philosophy, he states,
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"offers excellent resources for thinking about" various political princi-
ples, such as freedom, and how they are affected by technology [5]; p.
6). Nudging has given rise to principled objections since its inception
and, as nudge comes to shove, it becomes coercive and a threat to
liberty.
2. Nudging
‘Nudging’ is a term used to describe an approach to behavioural
modification, without the use of force, by both private and public ac-
tors. The term was coined by Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler,
who argue that it is not only possible, but also legitimate, to ‘actively
influence’ behaviour. Furthermore, they argue that this can be done
while respecting people's freedom [6]; p. 1). The art of influencing
behaviour is not new, but the new combination of insight from beha-
vioural economics, cognitive psychology and social psychology made
Sunstein & Thaler's theory an important addition to existing knowledge
[7]; p. 85 [6]; p. 4).
They call their approach libertarian paternalism, because the goal we
nudge people towards should be people's own welfare [6]. The issue of
who is the best judge of what my welfare is will have to rest until later.
For now, I will simply point out that idealism is all well and good, but
the tools of nudging could just as easily be used for non-idealistic as for
good purposes. When we take what some would call a realistic – not
idealistic – stance on motivation, the theory becomes less paternalistic
and, quite simply, manipulative. People's actions are steered towards
whatever goals those who nudge us have – also towards what Sunstein
labels illicit goals [2]; pp. 12, 41).
Nudging arose from an understanding of irrationality – the fact that
people often make ‘bad’ choices. Too bad for rational choice theorists,
who rely on the ‘false assumption’ that people usually make choices that
are in their best interest [6]; pp. 4, 9). Real people have cognitive
weaknesses. Sunstein & Thaler ([6], p. 9) refer to such things as us
failing to live up to Bayes' rule, that we use rules of thumb ‘that lead us
to make systematic blunders’, that we sometimes ‘prefer A to B and B to
A’, that we lack self-control and that we are influenced by the framing
of the issues we face.
The idea is that people often lack both self-control and a proper
long-term perspective. This leads them towards choices that, among
other things, make them obese and poor. This is because saving and
healthy eating are examples of behaviours that require both a long-term
perspective and some self-control [6]; pp. 9–11). We make better
choices in situations in which we have ‘experience and good informa-
tion’, which means that we are better at choosing the ‘correct’ ice cream
than we are at investing our money wisely or choosing the most ben-
eficial medical treatment [6]; p. 5). The latter actions are ‘complex,
uncertain, or otherwise challenging’, and in such situations, many do
what is cognitively easier than reaching what some categorise as the
best decisions [8]; p. 328).
To be slightly technical, there are several reasons for our bad
choices, such as the stickiness of the default option, anchors and framing
effects [6]. People tend to choose the default option when they have no
clear basis on choosing between alternatives, and anchors similarly
focus people's attention on some alternative that is presented at the
beginning of a choice process [6]; p. 18, 21–2). How something is
portrayed affects how we interpret different alternatives, and this is
what we refer to as framing effects [6]; p. 20). We also often lack clearly
formed preferences, and they even change depending on how we
choose – our preferences are ‘ill-formed and murky’ [6]; pp. 6, 23).
Another factor is suggestion: when uncertain, we rely on a) what most
people do, or b) what experts do [6]; p. 21). Yet another explanation is
inertia, which implies that moving away from the status quo is costly in
some way, and is therefore often avoided [6]; p. 22). Lastly, we have
the endowment effect, which points to the fact that people ‘value goods
more highly if those goods have been initially allocated to them’ [6];
pp. 22–23).
These considerations lead to the first proposition:
Nudging theory is based on the disciplines of psychology and be-
havioural economics, which deal with what affects people's choices,
irrational choices included. It has proven to be effective, and the in-
sights from the theory can be used by anyone with access to knowledge
about people and how they act, for whatever purposes.
Firstly, nudging theory is described as a theory about influencing
people's choices, and it is based on disciplines that deal with under-
standing how human beings think, act and decide [6].
Secondly, many experiments, both in laboratories and real-life im-
plementations, show that the techniques of nudging have real effects on
people's behaviour [2]; p. 8–9). This is not to claim that it is always
effective or that it is fully effective when employed. Some nudges fail, as
Sunstein [9] highlights in Nudges that fail, and, even when they work,
they do not determine every individual's actions. They merely change
the proportion of people who make the choices they are nudged towards.
Finally, the techniques of nudging are available to all actors, re-
gardless of their intentions and goals. This is merely to state that, while
some claim that nudging should only be used for good purposes, it can
just as easily be used by business owners to maximise profits etc.
3 When the nudge is powered by Big Data.
3.1. The rise of big data
Our age is often referred to as the era of Big Data [10–12]. The term
Big Data has many meanings, but Laney's three Vs are often used to
describe it. The Vs refer to the volume, velocity and variety of the data in
question [13]. Big Data means lots of data, moving quickly, in non-
uniform data sets. This development leads us to consider it as a new
phenomenon rather than just an extension of previous efforts to gather
data [14]; p. 45 [10]; p. 662 [15]; p. 137).
This article is not a technical examination of Big Data. For my
purposes it suffices to state that, with Big Data and the associated means
of tailoring information to individuals, a) we get more information
about individuals, b) we get more information about how people
function in general, and c) we have the means to deliver nudges to
specific individuals based on our existing knowledge of these people's
preferences and inclinations.
Furthermore, Big Data is not just something private companies are
involved in. Government a) gathers data and b) ‘is an important sec-
ondary beneficiary’ of the data gathered by others [16]; p. 1916). The
combined effect of private and public efforts to gather data can be re-
ferred to as the ‘surveillant assemblage’ [17]. Although private and
public gathering of data for different purposes can be considered as
isolated phenomena, so much data flows in so many directions that I
argue that a holistic view of the phenomenon is justified.
Richards & King [18] point to certain paradoxes of Big Data, two of
which are of particular interest in this context: those of transparency and
identity. The first relates to the fact that the collection of information is
often hidden, and that ‘its tools and techniques are opaque’ [18]; p. 42).
The second concerns identity formation and, more specifically, how Big
Data enables actors to ‘use information to nudge, to persuade, to in-
fluence, and even to restrict our identities’ [18]; p. 44).
The question of whether contributing to Big Data is voluntary is a
big debate in itself. Here, I will consider it as a phenomenon that is
becoming close to impossible to escape. It is associated with high costs,
particularly social, to withdraw from the reach of Big Data. It is also
problematic that others who are quite similar to me, provide informa-
tion that can subsequently be used to target me. These assumptions are
somewhat controversial, and I refer readers to Cohen [16] for a more
in-depth treatment of privacy and Big Data. Dotson [8] also deals with
the broader impact technology has on human choice-making. I focus on
the particular techniques of nudging combined with Big Data, while
Dotson [8] deals more fully with technology in general. He also focuses
on the difference between meaningful and meaningless choices, as this
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relates to the question of how technology can be conducive to the good
life.
3.2. When big data powers the nudge and makes it a shove
What is new about Big Data is a) the combination of insight into the
mechanisms behind decision making and b) highly detailed knowledge
of personality profiles. Advertisers have always attempted to manip-
ulate our decisions, but the tools now available to them mean that
people can be nudged more effectively than before.
While writing this, I noticed an advertorial from an online casino,
which serves as a good example of this phenomenon. It boasts about its
innovative nature, and how Big Data and the individual tailoring of
content enable companies to attract more clients who play more and
stick around longer. With the data now available, the casinos know
more about what games each player likes, the kinds of odds and bets he
likes to play, and what makes him play, stop playing and change games
in the first place. Even the clients are said to appreciate this, as they get
exactly what they prefer and believe they desire [19]. They might be
happier for a while, but the ones who lose all their money will probably
be left wondering what on earth happened, as they are thrown off this
dazzling carousel ride that felt like just what they wanted.
Knowledge of your propensities lets actors lead you. You might have
certain inclinations that you are not even consciously aware of, but that
the data about you reveal [20]; p. 581). Being led in this manner is not
experienced as oppressive. Good marketing based on these principles is
rarely even noticed by the consumer, and people might feel freer than
ever. While we previously had ‘predetermined and inevitably artificial
categories’ as targets of marketing and policy, we now get information
and predictions ‘finely tailored to particular situations’ – and in-
dividuals [16]; p. 2921).
The concept of Big Data-powered nudging has yet to receive sys-
tematic academic attention, but Yeung's [21] article 'Hypernudge': Big
Data as a mode of regulation by design discusses some of the topics
covered in this article. Yeung argues that ‘Big Data nudges are ex-
tremely powerful and potent due to their networked, continuously
updated, dynamic and pervasive nature (hence 'hypernudge')’, and she
claims to be providing a ‘liberal, rights-based critique’ of this phe-
nomenon [21].
Yeung deals with the ‘liberal manipulation’ critique of nudging,
consisting of a) the questioning of illegitimate motives, and b) the
proposition that nudging can be construed as deception [21]; pp.
123–124). I argue that her critique of the deceptive qualities of nudging
is not particularly effective, since it seems to rely on a person's ‘right not
to be deceived, rooted in a moral agent's basic right to be treated with
dignity and respect’ [21]; p. 127). While this may be a fine goal, a
liberal need not go this far and can argue, as I do, that ‘hypernudging’
may be illegitimate simply because it deprives people of their liberty.
Helbing et al. [22] speak of the ‘big nudge’ when Big Data is com-
bined with nudging. They point to its effectiveness, but also to various
problems, such as its potential for abuse. The abusers could be crim-
inals, or perhaps foreign powers nudging people politically, for example
in order to interfere with elections. It could also be hidden government
activity – activity that is not desired or approved of by the people. This
is one of the main problems for proponents of nudging: the problem of
determining what is considered proper use of such techniques.
Outside of academia, the combination of Big Data and nudging
techniques has been seen as both dangerous and potentially enormously
beneficial. What the articles referred to in the next paragraph show is
an appreciation of how Big Data combined with nudging creates a
phenomenon of greater power, and thus greater potential for both good
and bad, than nudging as we used to know it.
Guszcza [23] discusses how Big Data and nudging can solve the ‘last
mile-problem’ – when you know where you want (others) to go, but
can't get there. Eggers, Guszcza & Greene [24] talk of a ‘supercharged’
nudge, and how ‘big data and the Internet of Things’ offer opportunities
for improving the effectiveness of nudging, and ‘improving government’
[24]. Coughlin [25] warns us that we can ‘take nudge theory too far’
with the help of Big Data and the Internet of Things. The drawbacks of
traditional nudging are overcome by using Big Data to ‘better under-
stand the real-time mood of the person, how much digital noise they are
willing to tolerate or how much nudge noise they are being subjected to
at that very moment’ [25]. Kittur [26] talks of how Big Data 'nudges' lead
to better merchandise decisions, and refers to Amazon's Jeff Bezos, who
states that their ‘Selling Coach’ program generates over 70 million au-
tomated machine-learned nudges a week that ‘translate to billions in
increased sales to sellers’.
In politics, too, nudging is being taken ‘further than ever before’,
with governments creating ‘behavioural units’, like Britain's
‘Behavioural Insights Team’, which is working to create the best nudges
with the help of Big Data [2,27]; pp. 8–9). Hugill [28] also describes the
Behavioural Insights Team, and how it has added data science ‘which
aims to use the latest methods from data science, machine learning and
predictive analytics to make smarter policy implementations’. Such
developments should leave no doubt about the importance of discussing
the legitimacy and implications of nudging.
To sum up: Nudging is ‘rooted in an understanding of how people
actually think’ and this understanding is becoming much more solid in
the age of Big Data [6]; pp. 23–24). Furthermore, ‘[p]resentation makes
a great deal of difference’ [6]; p. 24). With Big Data and social media,
presentation can be tailored to fit individuals, as can the delivery of the
nudges.
The data may show that I am most susceptible to nudges towards
impulsive purchasing decisions in the morning, whereas the sweet spot
for targeting you is in the evening. In addition, the data may show that I
am most susceptible to subtle nudges that streamline my choices and
appeal to my emotions, while you are more easily swayed by anchors
and framing effects properly deployed. Today, the nudgers can target
both of us in the optimal way, whereas they previously had to either
choose one of the approaches or some sort of compromise.
Based on the considerations above, I arrive at the second proposi-
tion regarding the combination of nudging theory and Big Data:
With Big Data, nudging can become so effective that it is hard to
withstand it, making the nudge more of a shove.
As described in this section, Big Data provides so much detailed
information about both a) individuals and b) the way people act in
general that nudging becomes increasingly effective. In addition, c) both
the content and delivery can be tailored to individuals. While a nudge
can be considered a welcome and slight push in a certain direction, a
nudge fuelled by Big Data can easily become more of a solid push, or
shove, that is hard to withstand.
4. Nudging and liberty
4.1. Negative and positive liberty
The distinction between negative and positive liberty is often used
in the debate about how nudging affects liberty [7,29,30]. I argue that
nudging is in conflict with both conceptions of liberty. I briefly relay the
main ideas from Isiah Berlin's [3] original work, before I deal with the
modern debate about nudging and liberty. I use liberty and freedom
interchangeably in the following, as is also done in most of the litera-
ture I review here.
Negative liberty is usually understood as the absence of interference
by other people [3]; p. 169). Complete absence is impossible, but
anything beyond the minimal contraction of my freedom by other
people is a violation of my negative liberty, and makes me ‘coerced, or
it may be, enslaved’ [3]; p. 169). This aspect of negative liberty will be
important in the following, as I argue that nudging might be construed
as a form of coercion. It must be noted that any interference by nature,
or other phenomena that are not people, is not considered an obstacle to
my liberty [3]; p. 169). Even nature nudges, according to Sunstein
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(2016, p. 35), but I will not consider such nudges. Negative liberty
concerns itself with impediments caused by other people.
Positive liberty, on the other hand, is about being a subject instead of
an object – ‘deciding, not being decided for, self-directed, and not acted
upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an
animal, or a slave incapable or playing a human role, that is, of con-
ceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them’ [3]; p. 178).
Berlin (2002, p. 178) writes that positive liberty is about being one's
own master, and being in control of our own lives. My life and my
actions should be the result of my own volition, and an autonomous
reflective activity should ideally be what is constitutive of my life [3];
p. 178). Carter [31] prefers to speak of self-mastery when discussing
what Berlin labels positive liberty.
Positive liberty requires a lack of obstructions. This is important,
since I might be enslaved in many ways, despite not being physically
coerced or having a restricted set of choices. If being enslaved to my
passions is a contrast to positive liberty, then the fact that nudging
exploits my passions and irrational inclinations becomes highly pro-
blematic. Berlin (2002, p. 179) discusses the emancipation that could
follow from being freed from such slavery, and the fact that it might
lead to a new and broader understanding of the self. I focus on more
direct threats to liberty posed by nudging than those related to such
forms of understanding of the self.
While the focus on genuine autonomy might lead one to believe that
nudging is definitely inimical to positive liberty, we must note that the
concept of positive liberty opens the door to the kind of paternalism
that Sunstein & Thaler espouses. If I am enslaved by my irrational
passions, a well-constructed nudge that lets me be free from it might be
seen as making me freer, even if it achieves its goals through the ma-
nipulation of unconscious processes instead of rational persuasion.
Paradoxically, I can be forced to be free under this conception of liberty,
which means that nudging and positive liberty have a less obvious re-
lationship than one might at first imagine [3]; p. 179).
I will limit myself to this understanding of the two forms of liberty
in the following, despite the obvious possibility of thoroughly critiquing
and developing them. Space, and the desire to perform an analysis of
how nudging affects liberty preclude such a debate, so I will refer
readers interested in a fuller treatment of these concepts to Berlin's Two
Concepts of Liberty [3] and Taylor's [32] What's wrong with negative lib-
erty for a more detailed description. For a more general critique of the
idea of two separate forms of liberty, see MacCallum [33] and Skinner
[34].
4.2. Nudging and negative and positive liberty
4.2.1. Background
The debate about nudging in politics is now approximately 10 years
old, and I will briefly discuss some of the main points in the debate that
followed the popular book by Sunstein and Thaler [1]. I do not limit my
usage of the term to government nudging, and argue, along with Sun-
stein [2]; that nudging can be employed by anyone, for whatever
purpose. Hausman & Welch ([29], p. 131) note that advertisers and
charities also nudge, and Goodwin states that advertisers have done this
for a long time [7]; p. 87). Nudge marketing is a concept that builds on
the same principles as government nudging (apart from the paterna-
listic demands imposed at times by Sunstein and Thaler) [35,36]. I treat
private and public nudging as equal with regard to their impact on
liberty.
The difficulty of regulating private nudging should not preclude a
debate about its implications for liberty. Nor should it imply that we
had better resign and allow it, and even promote government nudges,
simply because private actors nudge. Some, like Hausman & Welch
([29], p. 131), seem to suggest that private nudges are acceptable due
to their ubiquitous nature and resultant lack of effectiveness. I argue
that the difficulty of regulating nudging is not an excuse for allowing it,
and I also argue that nudges are becoming more and more effective. In
effect, these arguments in favour of nudging are considered both weak
and unsatisfying.
Nudging as I define it is an attempt to influence an individual's
decision making by appealing to subconscious mechanisms or known
irrational proclivities. I contrast this with rational persuasion, which
consists of attempts to influence behaviour through open and trans-
parent appeals to reason. I regard nudging as troubling, and I argue that
it is more so today than at any time before, because of new technology
and the information we now have about both human actions in general
and individuals. If traditional nudging was perceived as ‘deeply trou-
bling’, nudging powered by Big Data must be viewed as terrifying [7];
p. 86).
4.3. Negative liberty
Goodwin [7] states that the concept of nudging is based on the idea
of negative liberty, and that this leads to problems when positive liberty
is considered as well. For him, nudging is compatible with negative
liberty, since it preserves freedom of choice. I argue that Goodwin is not
correct in either of these assumptions, as a) negative liberty is more
than he makes it out to be, and b) negative liberty can be negatively
affected by nudging. Mills ([30], p. 28) also criticises Goodwin for
having an overly simplistic view of some key concepts, such as pa-
ternalism and autonomy, and I argue that this also applies to his idea of
negative liberty.
What he presents as negative liberty is a rather Hobbesian concept,
where even a man who is robbed at gunpoint is free, because he has the
freedom to choose to resist the robber. For Goodwin, ‘negative freedom is
merely concerned with whether you are, strictly speaking, able to make
a choice’ [7]; p. 88). Furthermore, it requires not being physically ob-
structed by external obstacles [7]; p. 88). This exact example is often
used to describe the Hobbesian notion of liberty, and not Berlin's [37];
p. 134). This is akin to the Hobbesian sailor who is free to sink if he
dislikes the only other option, which is to abandon his goods in order to
save himself and his ship [38]; p. 137). When I speak of negative lib-
erty, I will not just consider physical obstacles, and I do not consider
theoretical, but very costly alternatives sufficient to say that freedom is
preserved. If another person, by conscious actions, makes it exceedingly
costly for me to do what I might otherwise do without hurting him or
anyone else, without him having a reason that makes his actions rea-
sonable, this person restricts my liberty in a negative sense.1 So, while
nudging could be unproblematic based on Goodwin's (2012, pp. 87–88)
understanding of liberty, I object to this understanding, and will not
employ it in the following.
Hausman & Welch [29] argue that, while they do not think nudging
is libertarian, they do agree with Sunstein & Thaler that it would a) not
be coercive, and b) ‘not significantly’ limit freedom of choice [29]; p.
124). I disagree with them on the first point, and, as to the second, it all
depends on what one considers a significant limitation of freedom of
choice. It is claimed that freedom is unharmed because people are still
free to choose what they prefer [29]; p. 124). Hausman & Welch ([29],
p. 124) state that Sunstein & Thaler use liberty as the ‘absence of ob-
stacles that close off possible choices or make them more costly in time,
inconvenience, unpleasantness, and so forth’. In their article, they
employ the definition of liberty that Sunstein & Thaler subscribe to,
which is quite close to the conception of negative liberty we have al-
ready established [29]; p. 124).
However, nudging surely makes certain actions more costly, incon-
venient and unpleasant, and could thus constitute an obstacle to liberty.
This, I suppose, is where Hausman & Welch [29] would say that the
unpleasantness caused by requiring producers to print horrible photos
1 I will not consider the question of how the law relates to liberty, and ar-
guments such as Bastiat's proposition that the prohibition of unlawful acts is in
accordance with liberty, since such prohibitions, through law, are preservers of,
rather than threats to, liberty [47]; p. 25).
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meant to discourage smokers from smoking is not significantly limiting
their freedom, even though it will surely cause displeasure and incon-
venience. Thaler and Sunstein propose that their libertarian patern-
alism of nudges does not constitute a mandate, and that people will still
be free to smoke, eat badly and invest poorly [7]; p. 87). It is also
important to note that Sunstein [2] clearly argues from a utilitarian
stance: nudges may be theoretically problematic, but still worth it. This
also leads him to warn repeatedly of the ‘trap of abstraction, which can
create serious confusion’ [2]; p. 26).
I will pursue the implications for the kind of liberty I have here
described when discussing the coercive nature of nudging. In contrast
to Goodwin ([7], p. 88), who believes that champions of negative lib-
erty consider it an ‘abuse of words’ to see false consciousness, psycho-
logical pressure, lack of awareness etc. as obstacles to liberty, I keep this
door open. Not only physical obstacles to action are considered threats
to negative liberty, and a hypothetical freedom to choose will not ne-
cessarily be considered sufficient to render a person free if the set of
choices is limited, manipulated and associated with artificially high
costs of various sorts.
4.2.3. Positive liberty
One of the points often discussed in relation to nudging is patern-
alism. Nudging is often condoned because it is done in the interest of the
person being nudged. I will not focus on this aspect of Sunstein &
Thaler's theory for two reasons. Firstly, I consider nudging to be a
universal phenomenon that is not only associated with the government
and good intentions. Secondly, I believe that it is excruciatingly difficult
to arrive at a theory that leads to acceptance of the idea that one person
can force, or mislead, another person to act in ways he does not wish to
act, or at least does not know that he wishes to act, without his ap-
proval. That government can ban certain actions, and make undesirable
actions costlier, is all well and good, as long as this is fully transparent
and a matter of politics and social choice. While Sunstein & Thaler
argue in favour of a similar idea of transparency, it seems obvious that
affecting choice by appealing to subconscious and irrational mechan-
isms is not the same as overt governmental paternalism.
Let us assume that we have different ideas about what would be the
best course of action in some imagined setting. All my attempts at ra-
tional persuasion fail, but I am still convinced that I know better than
you do, and I want to enforce my will. I only have three options, which
are a) to overtly coerce you, b) to entice you by external rewards, or c) I
could exploit my knowledge of the imperfections of your decision-
making processes to make you act in the way I want you to Ref. [29]; p.
126). How is the last option more acceptable than the two that are
based on open and transparent incentives? If we somehow argue that it
is acceptable because you do not know that I have achieved my goal, a
whole array of mechanisms of manipulation, covert coercion and sub-
terfuge will be available to influencers of various sorts, and I find it
hard to believe that supporters of nudging really want to lead us to that
conclusion. As emphasised by Sunstein [2]; popular support for nud-
ging does not affect the issues I raise with regard to liberty.
I follow Hausman & Welch ([29], p. 128) when they argue that a
person's autonomy is diminished when ‘pushing’ becomes more than
rational persuasion. When a person chooses what he does because
someone has actively interfered with the available choices and the
presentation of alternatives, this must surely be considered a violation
of a person's right to be his own master in a broad sense. Sunstein
discusses the relationship between autonomy and nudging, and seems
to argue that people delegate certain decisions to the government, and
that this does not infringe on autonomy [2]; p. 63).
The arguments that some arrangement of choices would have in-
fluenced him either way is not in any way an argument in favour of
allowing active manipulation in order to achieve someone else's goals
through subterfuge.
Let us assume that you are blind, and that I somehow got into your
apartment before you got up and got ready for work one morning. I saw
that you had laid out your outfit for the day, and I found the colour
palette you had chosen utterly distasteful. I then quickly went out and
bought clothes that were much better looking, and put them in place of
what you had laid out. I put the original outfit back in your closet, so
that it was still available. I then left. You got up, put on the clothes I had
put there and went to work. I got you to wear what I wanted without
you even knowing that I had done so, and I did it all for your own good,
as I consider my sense of taste to be better than yours. Particularly since
you are blind, I might feebly argue, if you were to challenge me on this,
when your co-workers ask you why you are suddenly all colourful and
trendy. Yes, you would have worn clothes anyway, but that is in no way
an argument for me to make you wear something else. No matter how
distasteful, random or unfortunate your choice would otherwise have
been. I could of course have woken you up and asked you if you wanted
some help, but I could not nudge you towards trendiness in the way
described here. That would be akin to changing the default option,
which is one of the most common tools of nudging.
In this sense, the ideals of nudging, which supposedly only involve
marginal interference with liberty through the arrangement of choices
etc., means that a person's power to choose, and thus his autonomy, is
interfered with, [29]; p. 129). Hausman & Welch ([29], p. 135) state
something obvious when expressing their concern that ‘exploiting de-
cision-making foibles will ultimately diminish people's autonomous
decisions-making capabilities’ [29]; p. 135). Sunstein ([2], p. 61) is also
aware of the arguments against depriving people of decision-making
practice, but states that ‘[i]n many areas, what the choice-making
muscle needs is rest, not exercise’.
But can a nudge not improve people's positive liberty, and empower
them? If irrationality makes me act in ways I would not approve of if I
understood them, then perhaps I am freer in a world where my choices
are laid out in ways that minimise the unfortunate effects of my cog-
nitive weaknesses and lack of will power? Mandatory cooling off-per-
iods before making choices that we know people often regret, for ex-
ample, could be seen as empowering in this way [29]; p. 132). It is
equivalent to a policy of forcefully tying people to the mast in order to
resist the siren song.
However, nudges are not always mandatory and transparent. When
they are, I argue that they are more akin to regular government reg-
ulation based on traditional paternalistic principles, and should be
viewed as such. According to Mills ([30], p. 29), nudges are better than
traditional regulation because they preserve choice, but his evaluation
is dependent on his qualification that nudges lead us to actions that we
‘would not disagree with’. If I am not given a choice, or am not in-
formed of what is being done, I find it hard to see this form of guidance
as more liberty-friendly than regular overt regulation.
In addition to empowering through freedom from irrationality,
nudges can empower by providing freedom not to choose, freedom from
clutter etc., a point I will return to Ref. [30]; p. 29). Sunstein and Thaler
rely on a specific form of rationalism when they argue that what they
label irrational interferences in our behaviour should be corrected, but I
cannot deal fully with the concept of rationality in this article [29]; p.
126).
Nudges, Mills (2013, p. 29) states, may lead us towards an ‘au-
thentic life’, by letting us overcome our irrational impulses. He argues
that positive liberty should be concerned with ‘authentic decision-
making’, whereas ‘biases, blunders and temptations’ are obstacles to
this [30]; p. 30). If so, helping us overcome them is clearly empowering,
as it lets us achieve our ‘authentic’ goals [30]; p. 30). It is an interesting
debate, but I view this line of reasoning as analogous to the debate on
paternalism, where one opens the door for someone to label a person's
goals and actions as inauthentic and in need of correction.
Goodwin ([7], p. 88) refers to Taylor and the idea that positive
liberty is about individual independence and self-fulfilment. He then
seems to argue that nudging probably cannot be empowering, because it
is based on the Hobbesian liberty he called negative liberty [7]; p. 88).
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This is naturally a fallacy, as a theory may perfectly well be compatible
with concepts it does not explicitly discuss. A theory may be empow-
ering, even if it is founded on the idea of negative liberty.
Sunstein and Thaler prefers nudges that are transparent and subject
to monitoring and acquiescence [30]; p. 30). However, they are also
clearly aware that nudges are most needed, and most effective, when
people face complex issues and have a hard time understanding what
they really want, and what actions lead to what outcomes [30]; p. 30).
Transparency and voluntariness are hard to achieve when the issues in
question are in fact too complex to grasp. Otherwise, rational persua-
sion would most likely suffice, and I find it hard to believe that anyone
would prefer nudging to rational persuasion if they were equally ef-
fective and available. We will also see that nudges are most effective
when they are not transparent. If, as Mills ([30], pp. 30–31) states,
personal autonomy is based on individual self-control, ‘reflective au-
thenticity’ and ‘independence from coercive and manipulative influ-
ences’, it is difficult to accept the view that nudging is conducive to this
form of liberty, or any other.
4.3. The manipulative and coercive nature of nudging
4.3.1. Nudging and coercion
One of the defining characteristics of liberalism is an aversion to
coercion. Particularly the proponents of negative liberty cannot see
coercion, over and above what is necessary for society and order to
exist, as compatible with their idea of liberty. But what about manip-
ulation, or even secret coercion? Raz [39]; p. 377–8) distinguishes
between manipulation and coercion by stating that the first does not alter
a person's options, but instead ‘perverts the way that person reaches
decisions, forms preferences or adopts goals’. I argue that by, for ex-
ample, manipulating choice architecture and framing, nudging might
also involve interference with options, which thus makes it coercive,
according to Raz [39]; p. 377).
Let us assume that there is a mountain between where I am and
where I want to be. I cannot complain that I lack the liberty to get there
quickly because of this obstacle, unless I want freedom from necessity
and nature, which is not a kind of liberty I am interested in here. What,
then, if you stood between me and where I wanted to be, and physically
pushed me back and stopped me each time I attempted to pass you? You
would be exerting force on me, and my liberty would suffer as a result.
So far, I assume that everyone would agree.
But what if, instead of physically stopping me, you let me know that
you would shoot me dead if I attempted to pass. This is where Goodwin
[7] mistakenly believes that the champions of negative liberty would
feel that liberty was preserved. Just because you do not use physical
force to change my actions, you are stopping me just the same if your
threat of force is credible. You have a desire to prevent me from doing
something, and you impose a very high cost on the action you wish to
prevent. While I still have the choice of being shot dead, I cannot be said
to be free when you have consciously changed my incentives in such a
manner. If you inform me of your intention, my actions will be changed,
but what if you do not let me know that you intend to shoot me? Then I
would be as free to act as ever, and I would attempt to go there. You
would probably shoot me, and then I would be a victim of murder, but
not really unfree.
But what if you just really wanted me to stay away from where I was
going, and attempted to persuade me not to go? If you provided good
reasons that made me change my mind, my freedom would not suffer.
But what if you provided various incentives to affect my actions? If you
offered to pay me 100 dollars to stay away, and I valued those 100
dollars enough to do as you wish, I would be perfectly free, as I simply
used my freedom to make a transaction and changed my intentions. But
what if the incentive was negative? If you broke the law and promised
the penalty of death for my action, you would be using illegitimate
force to compel me to stay away, and my freedom would be limited as a
result.
But what if you simply said that you would hate me forever and
never talk to me again? While I might value your friendship and decide
not to go because of this, I would of course not be deprived of my liberty
in this process. You are free to exercise your right to like or dislike my
actions, and I have no cause to complain about loss of liberty. The
obstructions discussed in this paragraph are those of traditional reg-
ulation and normal social life, and they are all compatible with liberty,
both positive and negative.
However, what if you built a wall between me and my goal? You did
this before I arrived, and you left before I got there, so I merely saw the
wall when I arrived. Imagine that you even made it look exactly like a
mountain, seemingly the same obstacle that we considered earlier.
Would this be an obstacle that deprived me of liberty? I argue that this
is akin to the nudge, and I consider it to be a clear violation of liberty,
both negative and positive. The reason for this is that it has been
constructed with the intention of changing my actions, and it conflicts
with both the negative requirement not to be constricted by other
people and the positive requirement to be autonomous and master of
one's own actions.
4.6. Rational persuasion
Rational persuasion is used as a contrast to nudging, and I consider
rational persuasion to be fully legitimate. Such attempts at persuasion
protect individual liberty and let agents retain control of their own
goals and actions [29]; pp. 129, 135 [30]; p. 32). This is in strong
contrast to manipulative efforts to change an individual's actions by
exploiting his/her cognitive weaknesses, ‘circumventing the in-
dividual's will’ [29]; p. 129). The difference between attempting to
persuade someone and taking advantage of irrational mechanisms is
important [29]; p. 129). It is important to note that Sunstein [2] labels
efforts to inform as nudges, while I see this as rational persuasion.
Furthermore, the goal of the deception is of little interest. The
consequentialist ethic, as exemplified by Sunstein [2]; which might
justify nudging because the good effects it produces may be legitimate,
but it would still be the case that liberty would suffer from it. We can, of
course, argue that we value good effects more than liberty, and, if that
is what the nudgers argue, all is good, and we can choose the politicians
who propound the view we are most content with.
4.3.3. Manipulation and secret coercion
My contention is that any liberal who is opposed to overt coercion
should not be indifferent to secret coercion. While the overt kind gets
most attention, I argue that nudging combined with Big Data makes it
possible to guide people's decisions in a way that is no less problematic
than other forms of subtle guidance. Nudging is, in principle, inimical
to liberty, but I claim that it becomes more problematic the more ef-
fective it is, and particularly the more covert it is. Goodwin [7] calls for
more theorising about the manipulative nature of the nudge, especially
since the ‘nudge's libertarian credentials are undermined by the fact
that it targets individuals in their pre-rational state’ [7]; p. 91). It is this
aspect of nudging I take issue with, and I have clearly distinguished it
from rational persuasion and traditional overt regulation using in-
centives.
While Hausman & Welch (2010, p. 124) argue that nudging is not
coercive, they recognise that it could be a problem that a person's ac-
tions ‘reflect the tactics of the choice architect rather than exclusively
their own evaluation of alternatives’. They take a rather lenient stance
on nudging, given that they clearly see that, when nudges aim to un-
dermine an ‘individual's control over her own deliberation, as well as
her ability to assess for herself her alternatives, they are prima facie as
threatening to liberty, broadly understood, as overt coercion’ [29]; p.
130). Goodwin ([7], p. 89) also sees the same attempt to undermine
control of deliberation as a cause for concern. For Mills [30]; what
makes nudges troubling is that they ‘override and circumvent the au-
tonomous agent's rational decision-making capacities’, which thereby
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diminishes the agent's autonomy [30]; p. 32). He then calls this a form
of manipulation of moral concern [30]; p. 33).
What I argue in this article is that secret, or covert, coercion, is as
much of a threat to liberty as the more obvious kind. I would argue that
it is even more of a threat a) as it is difficult to perceive, and b) since we
do not have the same instinctual reaction to it as when someone phy-
sically coerces us.
Hausman & Welch ([29], p. 129–30) use the very interesting ex-
ample of subliminal messages. If they were effective, they say, and if
they could be used for beneficial purposes, would people still be free
when influenced by them? In our previous example, let us say that you
gained control over my television set and, for the past few weeks, you
have been flashing rapid alternate images of death and devastation
mixed in with images of the location I wanted to go to. All of a sudden I
no longer want to go there, but I have no idea why. I just do not feel like
it anymore. The mere prospect of going there makes me slightly queasy.
No need to shoot me or block me any longer, as you have achieved your
goal by using psychological methods.
Am I still free, even though you have achieved your goal and made
me to change my actions – or indeed my very goals – by your actions?
Or is it really the case that overt coercion, for example a requirement to
use safety belts in cars on threat of punishment, is less of a threat to
liberty than the covert kind? Could it be that an unhappily coerced
person is in fact freer than a happy, but unknowingly manipulated,
person is [29]; p. 130)? I would say yes. While ignorance can surely be
bliss, it does not promote freedom.
4.3.4. Non-physical force
Goodwin [7] also opines that it is difficult to say that nudging is
coercive, although, since it aims to exploit our cognitive weaknesses, it
is surely manipulative – although he calls it a subtle form of manipula-
tion [7]; pp. 86, 89). I argue that, once manipulation becomes effective
enough, it can be coercive. Few state explicitly that nudging is coercive,
but Hausman & Welch ([29], p. 130) agree that it is ‘alarmingly in-
trusive’ in that it diminishes our control over ourselves and our own
evaluations of goals and alternatives. The main question is whether or
not nudging involves the use of force. For Goodwin, coercion involves
an ‘attempt to pressurize a person (or persons) into adopting different
behaviours, usually by force’, and he argues that we cannot say that this
definition applies to nudging [7]; p. 89). The reason is that he finds it
difficult to find the use of force in a nudge [7]; p. 89). Even if his de-
finition states that force is only usually applied, I will examine the use of
non-physical force, as this is the key element in play. We have already
seen that Goodwin thought that negative liberty was only concerned
with external physical obstacles. I disagreed there, and I argue that
psychological force can be used to coerce. This is similar to what Faden &
Beuchamp [40]; p. 355) call psychological manipulation, where ‘a
person is influenced by causing changes in mental processes other than
those involved in understanding’.
Physical coercion is not particularly relevant, but I argue in favour
of broadening the concept of coercion to include phenomenon such as
psychological coercion and other forms of manipulation I describe here.
Hopper & Hidalgo [41] write about psychological coercion, which is
easily concealed and not easily understood. They argue that psycholo-
gical coercion ‘can be as effective as physical violence in exerting
control over a person’ [41]; p. 186).
We have already considered threats, for instance in the example
where you attempted to dissuade me by promising to shoot or shun me.
I do not consider such attempts to influence behaviour a threat to lib-
erty when within legal bounds. What of the force of the better argu-
ment, then – if you use your force of logic to guide me towards a dif-
ferent goal? In such a process you would be appealing to my rational
faculties and, should you succeed, it seems absurd to claim that my
liberty is hurt. I cannot possibly claim freedom from arguments that
change my opinion.
But rhetoric is more than logic, so what if you mix some pathos into
your persuasive endeavour? I might not perceive this, and I may change
my actions, believing the cause to be your appeal to logos. No matter, as
what you have done is both open and legitimate. People are more than
logic, as rhetoricians have argued for nearly all of human history, and
we have little grounds for saying that our rational faculties are more
important than our emotional ones. Furthermore, persuasion is hardly
ever purely rational, no matter how hard we try [29]; p. 135). Antonio
[42–44] has written extensively on this topic. I follow him in his ar-
gument that reason and emotion are inseparable, and that the one
makes little sense without the other. If we were to ban appeals to
emotions, we would have to ban human communication and, all of a
sudden, our position would be quite absurd. Dotson ([8], p. 329) also
notes that human decisions are ‘local and emotional’, rather than ‘de-
tached and rational’.
This is an important point in relation to nudging, because nudging is
based on the idea that our rationality is our authentic faculty. Any in-
fluence of emotions and other irrational mechanisms should be purged.
I believe that this position is deeply problematic, partly because such a
purge by nudging could take the form of manipulation, and partly be-
cause no one has the authority to decide that I should take more notice
of some fictional rational process that is more present in me than my
perceived feelings. You may attempt to rationally persuade me that you
are right, but you cannot decide for me that your rationality is better
than my desired mix of rationality, emotions and various well or ill-
founded influences.
‘Best when invisible’
I have already touched upon the fact that nudges, according to
Sunstein & Thaler, should be open to monitoring by the nudgees [29]; p.
132). It is paradoxical, however, that a lot of the nudges work far better
when covert than when open and transparent [7]; p. 89). An obvious
reason is that, if people immediately recognised the goal of the nudge
and agreed with it, rational persuasion would suffice, and there would be
little reason to appeal to unconscious and irrational mechanisms in
order to manipulate behaviour.
If. instead of creating associations between death, decay and my
goal, you said that these things were connected, I could hardly fault
you. I would ask you why, and if you were able to convince me that
these things were connected, you might succeed in diverting me.
However, I would be free to consider your arguments null and void, and
if so, no such associations and subconscious aversions to my goal would
have been created.
Covert nudges must not be confused with rational persuasion, as
they can be seen as an admission of the fact that rational persuasion is
often ineffective. When someone openly targets the rational faculties of
a person by providing him with facts and arguments, and attempts to
persuade the person to act in a certain manner, this is persuasion, not
nudging. If you can persuade someone in this manner, why use sub-
terfuge to change their behaviour?
Framing effects are one of the prime examples of nudging [2]; p.
91). If you know that I have an irrational fear of snakes and that I love
songbirds, you could portray the way towards my goal in two ways. You
could either lament the scarcity of birds, and indicate that it is probably
due to the existence of snakes in the area, which is factually true en-
ough. Or you could alleviate my fear of snakes by saying that there is
probably something like a 99.9% chance of me never seeing a snake
here, and that the chances of meeting beautiful birds, just dying to sing
to me, are just about as great. If you told me that you were framing
these versions in different ways, and then provided me with the prob-
abilities for and against whatever I liked or disliked, much of the effect
would disappear. Framing is most effective when it is covert.
A nudge that is explained can be likened to rational persuasion, and
is not of particular interest to me here. If we explain to a person that the
choices have been rearranged, because of a public desire to reduce
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obesity and the fact the people in general have quite a sweet tooth, the
rearranged menu would be just fine. Whenever we hide the nudge, it
becomes a nudge proper, and is meaningfully separated from rational
persuasion.
A final point to note is that nudging may be problematic due to
people's individual differences [7]; pp. 88–89). What if I am a cognitive
scientist with great knowledge of political science and nudging. My
power to discover and evaluate the nudges I encounter would be quite
substantial, whereas, in the case of someone who has never heard of
either the disciplines or the nudge, the same power would probably be
greatly limited. Goodwin [7] points to nudging being unfair and, while I
cannot pursue this topic here, it is possible to envisage a situation in
which people with certain capacities are able to resist nudges and retain
their original liberty, whereas, for others, the nudge truly becomes a
coercive shove [7]; pp. 88–89). I argue that everyone's ability to resist
the nudge is threatened by Big Data and its application, but differences
in such abilities will continue to exist until we are all unable to resist the
nudge – a situation I do not consider particularly realistic.
4.4. Nudging as a) ineffective and b) unavoidable, and c) choice as
exhausting
I will briefly consider three possible arguments against being con-
cerned about nudging. The first is that it is ineffective, the second that it
is unavoidable, and the third that choice is exhausting.
4.4.1. Tolerating nudging because it is ineffective
Hausman & Welch ([29], p. 131) argue that nudging by non-gov-
ernmental agents is tolerable because it is ineffective, and also that it
hard to regulate, but that is hardly a reason to resign philosophically.
Furthermore, my argument is that nudging is effective, and is becoming
more and more so, so this type of argument misses the mark on two
accounts.
Nudging is subject to abuse, but Hausman & Welch ([29], p. 135)
actually state that the main protection against this is ‘our limited pro-
ficiency at exploiting flaws in human decision making and the extent to
which efforts at shaping choices on the part of different agents undercut
one another’ [29]; p. 135). This reasoning fails for two reasons. Firstly,
just because it is not effective does not make it acceptable and, sec-
ondly, we are becoming increasingly proficient at nudging, which is the
main argument of this article.
Similarly, Mills seems to argue that we should accept nudging be-
cause it is weak and too limited to be ‘genuinely transformative’ [30]; p.
33). While I argue that the problem with nudging is that it is a threat to
liberty, Mills, states that ‘the true failing of nudging in this regard is that
it is often so benign that it will fail to be genuinely transforming be-
cause it cannot establish original (or significantly alter existing) moral
or social norms’ [30]; pp. 33–34).
Goodwin ([7], p. 90) argues in a similar way, stating that a problem
with nudging is that it does not stick and leaves people vulnerable to
being nudged back. I posit that it is a form of secret coercion that is
inimical to freedom because it is effective, not that it is not effective
enough. Goodwin [7] has broader goals than the preservation of
freedom, however, and for him, nudging ‘will not be enough’ [7]; p.
90). He argues for deliberative democracy, and as such I agree, not
because nudging is not effective enough, but because rational persuasion
and debate are the only legitimate means of changing individuals'
(lawful) actions.
While Goodwin ([7], p. 90) wants regulation of the ‘rampant com-
mercialism and unregulated markets’ that may make government
nudges less effective, I argue for more regulation of both private and
public nudging on behalf of both positive and negative liberty.
4.4.2. Tolerating nudging because it is unavoidable
One of the arguments Sunstein and Thaler use in favour of nudging
is that it is unavoidable [6]; p. 8, [2]. Hausman & Welch (2010, p. 124)
seem to agree with Sunstein & Thaler's proposition that manipulating
choice architecture is less problematic than it might appear, since some
organisation of the choices we make is unavoidable [29]; p. 124). They
explicitly state that ‘[w]hen choice shaping is not avoidable, it must be
permissible’ [29]; p. 132).
This is related to the example in which you were blind. Let us, in-
stead, now say that you had assigned me the task of preparing your
outfit for the day, without further instructions. What should I now
choose? Some choice is unavoidable, and following the logic established
by Sunstein & Thaler and Hausman & Welch, I would now be free to
choose what I considered to be in your best interest. If we dismiss the
requirement that nudges have to be for the good of the nudgee, I would
even be free to choose whatever I considered best – period. If I were in a
naughty mood, and did not particularly like you, you could end up
wearing a clown costume.
The obvious solution would be to elicit your preferences when I was
given the assignment, so that I could choose what you wanted. In lieu of
that, I could prepare two different outfits, and either tell you the dif-
ference, or leave a note in braille. Me imposing my will on you is not
made legitimate just by the fact that some choice has to be made.
I would even argue that me choosing an outfit at random would be
less problematic in relation to your liberty than me deciding con-
sciously for you. Hausman and Welch ([29], p. 133) recognise the
‘important difference’ between a set of alternatives intentionally de-
signed to lead me in a certain direction and a random design. Random
design would also lead me, but only the designed choice would involve
the imposing ‘of the will of one agent on another’, which is what I
consider problematic as regards liberty [29]; p. 133).
4.4.3. Tolerating nudging because choosing is exhausting
I will only briefly consider the argument that nudging is good be-
cause choosing is so taxing. This is proposed by Sunstein & Thaler ([6],
p. 8, 15), and it is worthy of mention. Too many alternatives can be
confusing, and a limited set of choices can feel liberating. While this can
certainly be the case, it is strange to argue that a constricted choice set
increases liberty. If that were the case, one would definitely have to
adopt the positive conception of liberty, and see this as empowering.
Similarly, their focus on the default option drives them at times to-
wards a stance that could lead them to being seen as champions of the
freedom not to choose. It certainly seems paradoxical, but let us consider
an example.
If I am selling you an online service, and I want you to choose a
certain option that I know you would not have chosen without my in-
terference, I could introduce many different choices in the hope that
you would not be willing to sift through them all, and instead choose
the default option that I want you to choose. This would of course be
rather devious, but the chances are that I would be punished by you and
other customers [35]. It is, indeed, hard to regulate such tactics, but
consumer protection laws, for example, can, and should, attempt to
deal with them. Manipulative and misleading advertising, along with
other kinds of objectionable manipulation by private companies or the
government, should be regulated, even if it seems difficult to fully
eradicate.
Similarly, when considering how to invest your savings for your old
age, it would be quite taxing if you were required to consider and agree
to each and every investment made by the fund in which you are in-
vesting. That is not a problem, however, as we very often consciously
delegate choices to others. Such delegation is not nudging, and it is not
problematic for liberty. When you decide that I should delegate, and
remove my choices without me knowing, it becomes deeply proble-
matic.
These considerations lead me to the third proposition about nudging
and liberty.
Nudging is, in principle, inimical to liberty, particularly to the ne-
gative conception of it. Furthermore, the more effective it is, the more
problematic it becomes.
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Nudging is problematic due to its covert and manipulative nature. A
strong nudge becomes more of a coercive shove, and thus becomes even
more problematic, particularly for proponents of negative liberty who
are wary of interference and coercion. While it is easy to construct
arguments against nudging based on positive liberty, it is also possible
to construct arguments in favour of nudging based on the same concept.
This leads me to consider negative liberty as the most interesting ap-
proach when analysing the implications nudging has for liberty.
5. When nudge comes to shove
5.1. The premises of my argument
I briefly summarise my propositions, which now turn into the three
premises in my main argument:
• P1: Nudging is about influencing behaviour, and it works• P2: With Big Data, nudge comes to shove• P3: Nudging is inimical to liberty, and more so as it becomes more
effective
5.2. Big data nudging as a threat to liberty
As noted in the discussion of premise 3 in 4.5, I do not consider
positive liberty to be the most fruitful concept when considering how
liberty is affected by Big Data nudging. I wish to note that, while I
consider the arguments against nudging based on loss of agency and not
being one's own master as both strong and valid, other arguments in
favour of paternalism and empowerment can easily be constructed on
the same foundations. I have discussed these issues in 4.2, and will
proceed to the threats to liberty as seen through the lens of negative
liberty.
Based on the combination of premises 1, 2 and 3, I argue that strong
and effective nudging constitutes a form of coercion. While not overt, it
may constitute secret coercion, and coercion of any kind must be seen as
inimical to liberty, and inimical to negative liberty as well. While lib-
erals of all sorts are quite adamant about fighting overt coercion, I
argue that it is time to take another look at the dangers posed by the
processes I discuss here. They might be a far greater threat to liberty
than the obvious violations of rights that more readily grab the head-
lines. Such a position requires us to view manipulative efforts and the
use of non-physical force as constitutive of interference, to use Berlin's
terminology.
If we turn to John Stuart Mill, he is not a champion of the kind of
utilitarianism that is engendered in the ‘libertarian paternalism’ of
Sunstein & Thaler [6]. While it may be permissible to stop a person
from crossing a bridge that we (but not he) know is about to collapse,
no person ‘is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe
years that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he
chooses to do with it’ [45]; pp. 142, 166). This is both because men are
most valuable to themselves and others when free to develop novel
ways of living and ‘experiments of living’, and because, when it comes
to their own lives, each person has ‘means of knowledge immeasurably
surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else’ [45]; pp. 120,
185).
However, while Hamburger [46] clearly stated that Mill is opposed
to interference and denial of choice, Mill himself opens up for ‘[c]on-
siderations to aid his judgement, exhortations to strengthen his will’, as
long as the individual is, in the end, free to choose for himself [45]; p.
143). Rational persuasion is fully compatible with liberty, since such
efforts can ‘aid his judgement’ and ‘strengthen his will’. Nudging as
contrasted with rational persuasion, on the other hand, is usually
covert, and not as effective when made explicit. Mill opens up for ap-
peals to a person's reason, not devices that play on cognitive ‘weak-
nesses’ in order to achieve what we think a person really wants.
6. Conclusion: when big brother nudges
I acknowledge the existence of arguments in favour of nudging, but I
conclude that it is problematic to use liberty as an argument for nud-
ging. Such an argument would have to be based on the concept of
positive liberty, empowerment and emancipation from irrationality, but
I argue that even stronger arguments against nudging can be built on the
same conception of liberty. Technology influences human decision-
making in various ways, and it is important that we critically evaluate
these effects [8]. In my view, Big Data-powered nudging has the po-
tential to be both manipulative and coercive, and we should be wary of
the effects such efforts have on liberty.
Most strands of liberal theory acknowledge the central findings from
cognitive and behavioural theory that describe human beings' far from
perfect capacity for rationality. The way we function makes us sus-
ceptible to manipulation and secret coercion, and a liberal theory can
perfectly well demand regulation in order to prevent the exploitation of
such weaknesses – and to protect individuals from abuse and coercion.
Such an assumption does not imply that people are not autonomous and
competent. It merely acknowledges the fact that we have various kinds
and degrees of flaws and inclinations, and also that reason is not the
only yardstick of authenticity. In the spirit of Mill, we should to a
certain degree be allowed to thrive or suffer from the results of the
actions these inclinations lead us to, although the government has a role
in making sure that it does not exploit our weaknesses unduly, and that
other actors do not do so either.
While I do not accept arguments in favour of nudging based on
liberty, it is easy to see that arguments based on utility could support
nudging. I do not evaluate the proper trade-off between utility and
liberty in this article, and it is obvious that, at times, utility trumps an
absolute demand for liberty. However, I argue in favour of transparent
traditional regulation and rational persuasion instead of nudging, when
these approaches can serve the same purposes. Should we choose to
nudge, we should not euphemise our efforts by claiming that we do so
on behalf of freedom. Sunstein's [2] trap of abstraction is perhaps not as
dangerous as the trap of consequentialist pragmatism.
On a final note, the issue of regulation of nudging is beyond the
scope of this article. I would argue, however, that we must not succumb
to the temptation to state that, because it is hard to regulate nudging, it
is of little interest to discuss how to attempt to do so. Particularly since
technology is making the problem at hand increasingly pressing.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2019.04.006.
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